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CASE NOTES
good will to his business if the goods are sold in a form or way which is
contrary to his restriction, equitable machinery will enjoin the offender.
Just as modern needs have brought about servitudes on land unknown
to the common law, they may also call for a limited departure from the
free alienation of personalty for the purpose of promoting desirable busi-
ness practices completely foreign to the common law.
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT-STATE LAW NOT
BINDING ON FEDERAL COURT IN
DIVERSITY SUIT
The plaintiff, a Massachusetts corporation, ordered thirty-six pieces of
a certain style of wool from the defendant, a New York corporation. The
final written contract contained a clause providing that "any complaint,
controversy, or question which may arise with respect to this contract
that cannot be settled by the parties thereto, shall be referred to arbitra-
tion. . . ." Delivery of the goods was made from New York to Boston,
and the plaintiff found latent defects in the goods which did not prove to
be the quality called for by the contract (plaintiff's version of fraud). In
an action for damages for alleged fraudulent misrepresentations made by
the defendant inducing the plaintiff to purchase the woolen fabric, the
district court denied a stay of proceedings pending arbitration. The court
of appeals reversed with a direction to grant the stay. The court of ap-
peals found that the Federal Arbitration Act' was a declaration of na-
tional law binding upon federal courts when jurisdiction is based solely
upon diversity of citizenship. Lawrence v. Devonshire, 271 F.2d 402
(C.A.2d, 1959).
"Maritime transactions" and transactions affecting "commerce," with
the exception of employment contracts, come within the operation of the
Federal Arbitration Act.2 Written provisions for arbitration in maritime
transactions and transactions affecting commerce are made valid, irrevoca-
ble and enforceable. 3 However, such arbitration agreements are not
grounds to make the transaction a federal question.4 Therefore, the ques-
tion of arbitration will not be raised in a federal court unless jurisdiction
is predicated on the judicial code. If a federal court has jurisdiction sep-
arate and apart from the arbitration agreement, and if the arbitration
agreement otherwise comes within the scope of the Act, then a stay of
the proceedings for purposes of arbitration will be granted upon applica-
tion of one of the parties. 5 In substance, these are the provisions of the
19 U.S.C.A. S§ 1 to 14 (Supp., 1959).
29 U.S.C.A. § I (Supp., 1959). 3 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (Supp., 1959).
49 U.S.C.A. §§ 4,8 (Supp., 1959). 5 9 U.S.C.A. § 3 (Supp., 1959).
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Federal Arbitration Act which, if matched against the rule of Erie v.
Tompkins, under the proper set of facts, will provide a constitutional
question to be decided by the United States Supreme Court.
An area of confusion in the federal courts was clarified in 1938 with
the United States Supreme Court decision in Erie. In a personal injury
case properly in the federal court because of diversity of citizenship, Jus-
tice Brandeis declared:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Con-
gress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State .... There is no
federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive
rules of common law applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature
or "general. .... -7
The Erie doctrine is designed to ensure the same result, for a state created
cause of action, in a federal court exercising jurisdiction because of diver-
sity as would be reached had the case been tried in a state court. The old
federal practice of applying "general" law to state created causes of ac-
tion was overruled" and strict adherence to the Erie doctrine has fol-
lowed.9
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the manner in which a
case is commenced in a federal court, but the ultimate result of the liti-
gation in diversity cases is governed by the state law. Whether or not
arbitration affects the ultimate result of litigation is a subject on which
the courts have altered their thinking in recent years. Historically, arbi-
tration was a procedural matter, something relating only to the remedy. 10
Recent thinking on this question is best stated in Bernhardt v. Poly-
graphic:"
[T]he remedy by arbitration, whatever its merits or shortcomings, substantially
affects the cause of action created by the State. The nature of the tribunal
where suits are tried is an important part of the parcel of rights behind a cause
of action. The change from a court of law to an arbitration panel may make
6 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
7Ibid., at 78.
8 E.g., Smith v. Tyson, 16 Pet. (U.S.) 1 (1842).
9 Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957); Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953);
Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Orange, Texas v. Levingston Shipbuilding Co., 258
F.2d 240 (CA.Sth, 1958); Smith v. Pasqualetto, 246 F.2d 765 (C.A.lst, 1957); Smith v.
Potomac Edison Co., 165 F. Supp. 681 (D. Md., 1958); Powell v. Home Insurance
Co., 164 F. Supp. 654 (E.D.S.C., 1958).
10 Heckers v. Fowler, 2 Wall. (U.S.) 123 (1864); California Prune and Apricot
Growers Assn. v. Catz, 60 F.2d 788 (C.C.A.9th, 1932); Meacham v. Jamestown, 211
N.Y. 346, 105 N.E. 653 (1914).
1350 U.S. 198 (1956).
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a radical difference in ultimate result. Arbitration carries no right to trial by
jury that is guaranteed both by the Seventh Amendment and ch. 1, art. 12th,
of the Vermont Constitution.12
Agreements to arbitrate are revocable at common law up until the time
an award is rendered. Whether an agreement to arbitrate is revocable, or
irrevocable, adds weight to the theory that arbitration affects "substance."
In the Lawrence case, Judge Medina adopted the thinking of Bernhardt.
There seems to be little doubt that the ultimate result of arbitration could
easily be the opposite of the result of a judicial trial on the same subject
matter. Seemingly, it would follow that a federal court may not apply
the Federal Arbitration Act in diversity cases when to do so would sub-
stantially affect a state created cause of action.
At this point, the Erie rule could provide a solution to the problem of
arbitration in the federal courts. In a case involving a maritime transac-
tion, or some matter affecting commerce, which is before the federal
court solely because of diversity, the Federal Arbitration Act would be
inapplicable because the state law is the only applicable law. In fact, this
was Justice Frankfurter's reasoning in his concurring opinion in Bern-
hardt." But since that case did not involve a maritime transaction, or a
contract affecting commerce, the reasoning was neither decisive in that
case, nor controlling for subsequent cases.
As previously stated, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
chosen to find that the Federal Arbitration Act is a declaration of sub-
stantive national law binding upon the federal courts. To support this
theory, it is necessary to look to the purpose of arbitration and the Fed-
eral Act and the power upon which Congress could predicate such a
declaration.
12 Ibid. at p. 203. Whether the arbitrators misconstrued a contract is not open to
judicial review. The Hartbridge, 62 F.2d 72 (C.C.A.2d, 1932); Mutual Benefit Health
& Accident Assn. v. United Cas. Co., 142 F.2d 390 (C.C.A.Ist, 1944). Questions of
fault or neglect are solely for the arbitrators' consideration. Richardson & Sons v.
Hedger Transportation Corp., 98 F.2d 55 (C.C.A.2d, 1938). Arbitrators are not bound
by the rules of evidence. Burchell v. Marsh, 17 How. (U.S.) 344 (1854); Spring Cotton
Mills v. Buster Boy Suit Co., 275 App. Div. 196, 88 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1949) aff'd, 300 N.Y.
586, 89 N.E.2d 877 (1949). They may draw on their personal knowledge in making an
award. American Almond Products Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales Co., 144 F.2d 448
(C.C.A.2d, 1944); The Guldborg, 1 F. Supp. 380 (S.D.N.Y., 1932); Spring Cotton Mills
v. Buster Boy Suit Co., 300 N.Y. 586, 89 N.E.2d 877 (1949). Absent agreement of the
parties, a written transcript of the proceedings is unnecessary. Application of Shapiro,
197 Misc. 241, 97 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1949), modified 277 App. Div. 927, 98 N.Y.S.2d 451
(1950); Andersen Trading Co. v. Brimberg, 119 Misc. 784, 197 N.Y.S. 289 (1922). Swear-
ing of witnesses may not be required. Application of Shapiro, 197 Misc. 241, 97 N.Y.S.2d
644 (1949), modified, 277 App. Div. 927, 98 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1950). And the arbitrators
need not disclose the facts or reasons behind their award. Shirley Silk Co. v. American
Silk Mills, Inc., 257 App. Div. 375, 13 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1939).
13 Shirley Silk Co. v. American Silk Mills, Inc., 257 App. Div. 275, 13 N.Y.S.2d 309
(1939).
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Arbitration has come to find favor with the courts, although this was
not always so. 14 Obviously the expeditious settlement of disputes and the
resulting relief to overloaded court calendars was intended by Congress. 15
Similarly, the participants in disputed transactions are afforded more eco-
nomical and prompt solutions to their controversies, something Congress
could not overlook when passing the Act.16
But the source of power and the extent to which Congress chose to
exercise it is vital in determining whether Congress intended to establish
substantive national law in the field of arbitration. Legislative history is of
negligible value in the determination of Congressional intent. 17 The Fed-
eral Act covers a narrow field, namely maritime transactions and com-
merce. Congress has plenary power in these areas and, by reason of this
legislative domain, may act to the exclusion of the states. The concept of
Congressional power over individuals whose activities affect interstate
commerce has greatly developed since 1925.'8 Since the field of regula-
tion was expressly narrowed, and since the Constitution gives Congress
the exclusive power to deal with these matters, the Erie doctrine would
have no application. It seems reasonable to assume that Congress intended
the benefits of Section 2 to apply to all contracts within its power to regu-
late under the Commerce and Maritime clauses of the Constitution.19 Un-
der this interpretation of the Act, its provisions would be enforced in
federal courts whose jurisdiction is based solely on diversity.
There have been two cases, Wilson v. Freemont20 and Pioneer Trust
and Savings v. Screw,21 apparently based on diversity, which applied the
Federal Act. However, they are doubtful support for the theory that
Congress has declared a policy of substantive national law.
In the event that the United States Supreme Court, or federal courts of
the Seventh Circuit adopt the "national law" reasoning of the case at bar,
the Illinois laws and decisions on arbitration would conflict with the fed-
eral law. There must be a dispute existing at the time arbitration is agreed
to in order that agreements to arbitrate become binding in Illinois. 22 The
14 Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439 (C.A.2d, 1953).
15 Radiator Specialty Co. v. Cannon Mills, 97 F.2d 318 (C.C.A.4th, 1938).
16 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
17 H.R. Rep. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1 (1924).
18 Compare Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) and Child Labor Tax Case,
259 U.S. 20 (1922) with Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) and N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
'9 U.S.C.A. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Art. I1, § 2, cl. 1.
20 77 F. Supp. 364 (D.Neb., 1948).
21 73 F. Supp. 578 (E.D.Wis., 1947)
22Cocalis v. Nazlides, 308 Ill. 152, 139 N.E. 95 (1923); McKenna Process Co. v.
Blatchford Corp., 304 I. App. 101, 25 N.E.2d 916 (1940).
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resulting situation would be an arbitration agreement unenforceable in
the Illinois courts because there was no existing dispute when executed,
but valid, enforceable, and irrevocable in the federal court hearing the
case because of diversity.
Congress has not seen fit to make arbitration agreements federal ques-
tions. Since the jurisdiction of the federal courts in matters of arbitration
must be based on diversity, or a federal question, the more utilitarian
solution to this problem would be strict adherence to the Erie doctrine
and Justice Frankfurter's reasoning in the Bernhardt case. Conflicting re-
sults in state and federal courts dealing with the same arbitration agree-
ment in the same state would thus be avoided.
FEDERAL PROCEDURE-LIKELIHOOD OF THE DEFEND-
ANT CONTINUING IN THE NARCOTICS TRAFFIC
HELD SUFFICIENT GROUNDS TO DENY
BAIL PENDING APPEAL
The defendant was found guilty by a jury of a violation of the Federal
Narcotic Control Act involving twelve ounces of heroin.1 The trial judge
entered a conviction, sentenced the defendant to fifteen years in prison
and imposed a fine of $10,000. Following motions after verdict the de-
fendant served notice of intent to appeal, and asked that bond be set. The
trial judge refused to enlarge the defendant on bail pending appeal for
reasons, inter alia, that the defendant had been previously convicted of a
narcotic offense by the same court, and served a sentence of some three
years, but did not learn from his previous experience and had returned to
unlawful dealings in narcotic drugs. Under such circumstances, the trial
judge refused to assume the responsibility of putting defendant on the
street where he could again commit such violations. The trial court also
found defendant's appeal to be frivolous. The defendant appealed this
ruling and, in a memorandum and order, the appellate court affirmed the
1 21 U.S.C.A. § 174 (Supp., 1959) provides: "Whoever fraudulently or knowingly
imports or brings any narcotic drug into the United States or any territory under
its control or jurisdiction, contrary to law, or receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in any
manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of any such narcotic drug
after being imported or brought in, knowing the same to have been imported or
brought into the United States contrary to law, or conspires to commit any such
acts in violation of the laws of the United States, shall be imprisoned not less than
five or more than twenty years, and, in addition, may be fined not more than $20,000.
For a second or subsequent offense (as determined under section 7237(c) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954), the offender shall be imprisoned not less than ten or
more than forty years and, in addition, may be fined not more than $20,000.
"Whenever on trial for a violation of this section the defendant is shown to have
or to have had possession of the narcotic drug, such possession shall be deemed sufficient
evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains the possession to the
satisfaction of the jury."
